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IX. Evidence
Introduction
Paul F. Rothstein*
The past year's developments in the law of evidence have been charac-
terized by a hardening attitude toward criminal defendants. The United
States Supreme Court's evidentiary rulings during the term covered by the
Second Circuit Review (1971-72) manifested this trend (although not
uniformly'). For example, police stop-and-frisk authority was broadened
(and with it the use of evidence obtained therefrom);2 the scope of the im-
munity from criminal prosecution required to be granted by a governmental
body before self-incriminatory statements can be compelled from a witness
was narrowed;' the right to have counsel at line-ups was limited to post-
indictment or post-charge line-ups (with a consequent broadening of the use
of counselless identification evidence);' the preliminary burden of proof on
* B.S. 1958, L.L.B. 1961 Northwestern, Fulbright Scholar, Oxford 1961-63; Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Reporter, Commissioners on Uniform State Las;
Special Litigation Consultant, United States Treasury; Consultant U.S. Senate Judiciar) Com-
mittee, Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures; author of textbooks and articles in
the area of evidence law.
For decisions in the 1971-72 term counter to the trend, see, e.g.. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.
473 (1972) (convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel may not be used to
impeach); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (imposing obligation on prosecutor to
disclose unfavorable matters-but see Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), limiting such
obligation); United States v. United States Dist. Court, E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(rejecting power of executive to wiretap without warrant in domestic subversion cases); Brooks
v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (defendant wishing to testify cannot be required to do so as
first witness). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (virtually eliminating the death
penalty); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). and Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972)
(confirming the unconstitutionality of racially slanted juries); Papachristou v. Jacksontille, 405
U.S. 156 (1972), and Smith v. Florida, 405 U.S. 172 (1972) (voiding certain kinds of vagranc)
statutes); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (voiding certain kinds of abusive language
statutes); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (voiding a guilty plea due to gotem-
ment default in performing the terms of a plea bargain agreement); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 US.
189 (1971) (extending the rights of indigents to obtain transcripts of their trials); Britt v. North
Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
2 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See United States v. Bis%%ell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972) (governmental power to have regulatory inspections of a gun dealers' premises).
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (the privilege against self-incrimination
may be overcome by a grant of immunity from use of the testimony and fruits thereof, rather
than from prosecution for the transaction-resolving earlier ambiguity in favor of the narroter
immunity). Some federal decisions in New York had been to the contrary. See. eog,. In re
Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972) (right
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the government to initially prove the voluntariness of confessions was fixed
at "preponderance of the evidence" rather than "beyond a reasonable
doubt";5 and the "harmlessness" of evidentiary constitutional error was
made easier to find.' Taken together with the possibility of the implementa-
tion of non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases, also approved as constitu-
tional by the Supreme Court during the term,' these developments will have
far-reaching effects.
The above-noted trend was not confined to Supreme Court decisions.
Redrafts of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidences during the period
broadened the permissible use of prior convictions for impeachment pur-
poses9 and of governmental privileges covering secret information'" and in-
to counsel at preliminary hearing not retroactive). Cf. Neil v. Biggers, 41 U.S.L.W. 4064 (U.S.
Dec. 6, 1972) (totality of circumstances and exigencies makes suggestive identification admissi-
ble).
5 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (also deciding that it is not constitutionally
required that the jury pass on voluntariness after the judge has determined the confession to
be voluntary).
I Compare Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371
(1972) with United States ex rel Rosenberg v. Mancusi, 445 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied. 405 U.S. 956 (1972), and United States ex rel Ross v. LaVallee, 448 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.
1971). Several decisions during the term have dual connotations for criminal defendants. See,
e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (no constitutionally compelled journalist's
privilege).
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence [hereinafter cited as Rule 609] have been
approved by the Supreme Court (41 U.S.L.W. 4021 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1972)) and transmitted to
Congress. Under the enabling statute pursuant to which the rules were drafted, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1970), they become effective ninety days after such transmission to Congress or as the
Court provides, unless vetoed by Congress. The Court has fixed an effective date of July 1,
1973. Several bills in Congress are seeking additional reviewing time. See, e.g., 119 CoNo. Rrc.
52241 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1973). The Senate and House, as of this writing, have not yet agreed
on a bill. The questions raised in Congress focus upon what is considered to be the undue
breadth of the governmental privilege, the narrowness of personal privileges, and the scope of
the rulemaking powers of the Supreme Court under the Constitution and the enabling statute.
(Compare Justice Douglas' dissent to approval of the proposed Rules, 41 U.S.L.W. 4021 (U.S.
Nov. 21, 1972)).
' Compare Rule 609 as it appeared in drafts of March, 1969, March, 1971, and Oct., 1971,
with the current draft. The changes deleted (I) an exemption for convictions entered on nolo
contendere pleas; and (2) the judge's power to exclude otherwise permitted convictions if in a
particular case he found that prejudice outweighed probativity. In addition, the changes (3)
allowed use of convictions in earlier life (which would have been regarded as too stale under
older drafts) if the person had any other later convictions, the penal consequences of which
extended into the ten-year period immediately preceding the trial at which the witness was to
testify; and (4) partially abrogated the notion that a pardon or annulment based on rehabilita-
tion prevents use of the conviction, where there has been a subsequent conviction belying the
rehabilitation.
These and the other changes discussed in the text were primarily the result of a specter
raised by Senator McClellan of the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedure and by the Justice Department. This specter was the threat of Congressional inter-
vention in the rulemaking function, assumed to be in the Supreme Court and its appointed
1122 [Vol. 39: 1121
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formers' identities."
Abroad, the Eleventh Report (Evidence) of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee of Great Britain,' 2 prepared during this period, recommended
that an accused's silence in the stationhouse or in court be permitted to be
taken as evidence against him; that warnings given a suspect by police be
curtailed; that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, rendering evidence
derived from a coerced confession inadmissible, be abolished; that spousal
privilege and corroboration requirements be narrowed; 13 and that unsworn
out-of-court statements (oral or written) of individuals, whether they are
present in court or not, be accepted as affirmative evidence, provided that
certain requirements of basic fairness are met." The Report, which mirrors
drafters. See note 8 supra. Much of the history of these pressures is not recorded. But see 117
CONG. REC. 15193 daily ed. Sept. 28. 1971). See also D.C. CODE § 14-305 (1970 amend.), a
congressional "overruling," for the District of Columbia, of Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d
763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), a case granting judges in the District a powxer similar to that itemized at
(2) supra this note and purposely deleted in the new draft. The Second Circuit grants the judge
such a power. See note 34 and accompanying text.
10 Compare Rule 509 in drafts of March, 1969, March, 1971, and Oct,, 1971, with the
current draft. The changes added a category of"official information" to the privileged matters,
which formerly included only military and state secrets. The changes also pro-ided for hearings
secret from the attorneys and parties for determining privilege, and eased the gowernment's
burden in establishing privilege.
" Compare Rule 510 in drafts of March, 1969, March, 1971, and Oct., 1971, with the
current draft. The changes (I) expanded the privilege to cover informants to legislative organs
as well as law enforcement officials, (2) required only that the information furnished b) the
informer "relate" to "possible" law violations rather than "reveal a violation," (3) provided
for hearings secret from the attorneys and parties for determining privilege, and (4) reduced
the court's power to reveal showings.
12 CMND. No. 4991 (1972).
13 See the narrowing of spousal privilege in Rule 505.
" Additional recommendations include:
(I) broadening the acceptable forms of and occasions for lay and expert opinion
testimony (in a fashion very similar to Article VII of the Rules),
(2) increasing receptivity of children's testimony (as under Article VI of the
Rules);
(3) abolishing the rule requiring early showing of a prior inconsistent writing
(as under Rule 613);
(4) reformulating the rules regarding character and "other wrongdoing" evi-
dence for substantive and credibility purposes (somewhat along the lines of Rules
404,405,406, 608 and 609, but insulating the accused from such impeachment unless
he similarly impeaches other witnesses);
(5) restricting the self-incrimination privilege to incrimination under domestic
law (perhaps somewhat counter to the American trend u~hich expanded the privilege
to cover incrimination under state or federal law, see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n
of N.Y., 378 U.S. 52 (1964)); and
(6) placing only the production burden, and not the persuasion burden, on the
accused in connection with certain affirmative defenses.
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT (EVIDENCE), C!.ID. No. 4991
(1972).
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some developments already enacted on the civil side, 5 has not yet been acted
upon.
While these British proposals have an impact on American ears similar
to what would be the case if the Archbishop of Canterbury declared there is
no God, it should be noted that some of the British proposals have counter-
parts in this country.'" The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence broaden
traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule,'7 provide a catch-all exception
allowing evidence having "comparable circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness,"'" and allow former inconsistent statements of witnesses to be
used not merely for impeachment purposes, as formerly, but substantively
as well.' 9 The United States Supreme Court has approved the latter ap-
proach as constitutional not only by adopting the proposed rules, but also
in cases involving a similar provision of the new California Evidence Code.2"
The cases selected by the editors for inclusion2' in the current Second
Circuit Review, United States v. Taylor22 United States v. Aaron, 3 and
United States v. Mele2 4 taken together, show that the Second Circuit is not
wholeheartedly in accord with the trend. Further, in United States v.
,1 Civil Evidence Act 1968, c.64.
,6 See, e.g., in addition to those mentioned elsewhere herein, the inroads on the Miranda
warnings principle made by Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1970), and the Omnibus Crime
Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970).
'7 Rules 803 and 804.
z Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(6).
, Rule 801(d)(1). There is a question whether this opens the way to use of Miranda-
violating statements substantively, where the accused makes an inconsistent statement on the
stand. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1970).
" Nelson v. O'Neill, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
21 There was no dearth of evidence decisions by the Second Circuit, and the editors' task
of choosing was difficult. For example, to name just a few the editors were confronted with, in
addition to those mentioned elsewhere in this introduction, there were United States v. Mar-
quez, 462 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1972) (declaration against penal interests); United States v. Grant,
462 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1972) (co-conspirator's statement, wiretap): United States v. Ellis, 461
F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1972) (statement adopted by witness at trial not hearsay): United States v.
Brown, 456 F. 2d 293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972) (defendant's introduction of
evidence in his own defense is waiver of review of sufficiency of Government's case); United
States v. Blackwood, 456 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1972) (illegally seized tapes may be used for
impeachment); United States v. Cafaro, 455 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1972) (to apply co-conspirator
exception to hearsay rule, conspiracy must be found by "fair preponderance of the evidence");
United States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972)
(admissability of statements made after conspiracy's object fulfilled); Estate of Carter v. Com-
missioner, 453 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1971) (hearsay exception for state of mind), United States v.
Augello, 452 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1971) (admissibility of evidence of defendant's bad character);
United States v. Ferrara, 451 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied. 405 U,S. 1032 (1972)
(submission of undisputed facts to jury); United States v. Seewald, 450 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) (scope of privilege against self incrimination).
2 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
- 457 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1972).
24 462 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Cunningham,2 decided during the term covered by the Review, the Second
Circuit expressly rejected the Federal Evidence Rules' position that a wit-
ness' former inconsistent statements may be used substantively." Lest it be
thought that the Second Circuit is a conservative court in these matters, it
should be remembered that the same court has, in the past, pioneered use
of out-of-court statements against the accused where such were surrounded
by what were thought to be adequate safeguards (i.e., in certain circumstan-
ces where the statement was made before a grand jury-the so-called
"DeSisto rule," which essentially established a new exception to the hear-
say rule). In March, 1972, also during the relevant term, the Second Circuit
again, in United States v. Briggs,2 affirmed its adherence to Cunningham
and the limits marked out by the DeSisto line of cases,u by stating that
"ft]his case affords another illustration of how dangerous such a rule [Rule
801(d)(1)] would be.""0 In People ex rel Mancusi v. Stubbs,31 also decided
during the Review period, the Second Circuit strongly insisted on the need
for confrontation. It refused to admit into evidence against the accused a
transcript of a government witness' testimony at a previous trial, because
the government had not taken sufficient pains to attempt to bring the witness
from a foreign country for in-person testimony in the present trial. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that sufficient unavailability was estab-
lished to admit the transcript." The Second Circuit has also rejected the
broad admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes permit-
ted by the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, the Second Circuit
has recognized the judge's power, expressly removed by the current draft of
the Federal Rules of Evidence,- to exclude the use of otherwise permitted
convictions where the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative
value of such evidence, a power that is especially pertinent where the witness
is the criminal defendant.34
11 446 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1971).
2 Rule 801(d)(1). The Second Circuit also seemed to reject the position of Rule 607 that
a party may freely impeach his own witness. 446 F.2d at 197.
2 United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
457 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1972).
21 E.g.. United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied. 387 U.S. 905
(1967); United v. Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
10 United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d at 910 n.3. Again, as in many of the other decisions
on this question (see notes 25, 27, 29 supra), Chief Judge Friendly wvrote for the court. Compare
Judge Friendly's opinion with the somewhat more receptive attitude toward Rule 901(d)l)
expressed by Judge Bartels in United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d at 1169.
' 442 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1971), revd, 404 U.S. 1014 (1972).
: 404 U.S. 1014 (1972). Cf United States er rel Rosenberg v. Mancusi, 445 F.2d 613
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 956 (1972). also decided during the 1971-72 term (refusal
to admit in evidence against the accused out-of-court statements of a non-testif)ing co-
defendant.)
See note 9 supra.
See United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1971) (decided during the term under
11251973]
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Surveying other courts around the country, the trend in the law of
evidence against the accused is manifest, although there are contrary trends
which may prove to be encouraging to defense counsel. For example, bar-
riers to the use of various forms of scientific evidence seem to be lowering
in both civil and criminal cases, including spectography for voice identifica-
tion35 and lie detector evidence,36 although one progressive decision open-
ing the way for greater use of lie detectors has been reversed.37
The trend noted in this introduction is, in some degree, a trend toward
greater admissibility of evidence, as well as an attempt (however wise or
unwise) to do something about crime. Both undercurrents have existed for
some time. A trend toward greater admissibility exists on the civil side, as
well, where it cannot be said to redound to the benefit only of plaintiffs or
only of defendants. The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, mirroring
certain pioneering decisions, 3s have whittled down many impediments to
admissibility, such as incompetencies, 9 privileges," and restrictions relat-
ing to: (1) the form and content of expert testimony; (2) who is an expert
and when he may testify; 1(3) impeachment;" (4) character evidence;43 (5)
the scope of cross-examination;44 (6) the use of hearsay; 4 and (7) the use of
writings and modern forms of recording and copying, including tapes, re-
discussion); and United States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 950 (1971). These rulings are consistent with the skepticism expressed in some Second
Circuit opinions (notably by Judge Friendly) about the jury's ability to apply the lawyer's finely
wrought distinction between the use of evidence for substantive and for impeachment purposes.
See, e.g.. United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d at 933.
1 Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) and United States v.
Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972).
31 United States v. Ridling, 41 U.S.L.W. 2191 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 6, 1972).
" United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972). Cf. videotaped depositions,
discussed in Schmertz, Written Depositions, 16 VILL. L. REV. 7, 52 (1970).
u The Rules have incorporated pioneering views of certain decisions (e.g., United States
v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216
F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388
(5th Cir. 1961); McMillen Feed Co. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123, (Texas 1966)) all attempting
to liberate the hearsay rule by allowing exceptions to be made on the basis of trustworthiness
and necessity. Conversely, even in this pre-adoption period, decisions have often cited the Rule
for the proposition of liberalized admission (see, e.g., Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d
967 (4th Cir. 1971) (spontaneous exclamation approached on basis of necessity and trustworthi-
ness); Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1971) (presumptions); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (experts)).
a' Rule 601 and 610.
, Rules, Art. V.
" Rules, Art. XII.
42 Rules Art. VI, particularly Rule 607.
,3 Rules 404-06, 608-09.
" Rule 611(b).
'1 Rules, Art. VIII.
1126 [Vol. 39: 1121
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cords, photostatic copies, and computer materials,"8 to name just a few.
Some of the changes in evidentiary precepts have been retrogressive;
others have been progressive. However, as lawyers and social scholars con-
cerned with the output of our judicial system, we are obliged to recognize
these changes.
41 Rules, Arts. IX and X.
